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Introduction
T
he priva﬒ za﬒ on process ended, 
but the challenges in front of the 
Bulgarian economy are ge﬐ ing more 
serious than usual. The price increases of the 
energy resources all over the world, the wild 
development of technologies, and the cultural 
clashes force the managers from the private 
industrial organiza﬒ ons to carry out con﬒ nuous 
organiza﬒ onal change with the aim of achieving 
profi tabili﬑  simultaneously in two ways – through 
cost reduc﬒ ons and through growth, due to 
the intellectual capital u﬒ liza﬒ on. All this made 
me show some interest in the current state of 
human resource management a﬎ er the change 
in the ownership of these organiza﬒ ons. 
Description of the private industrial 
organizations
T
he following defi ni﬒ on of private industrial 
organiza﬒ on is given in this survey: each 
state-owned or municipal enterprise (company) 
with ac﬒ vi﬑  in the industrial sector, for which 
the previous owner has sold with a contract 
of sale above 50 % from its equi﬑  capital to a 
private economic en﬒ ﬑  (the new owner), who 
manages the enterprise a﬎ er the sale. The focus 
in the survey of such organiza﬒ on encompasses 
two periods of development:
The term of the sale contract, during which • 
The Post-priva﬒ za﬒ on control agency monitors 
the realiza﬒ on of the signed agreements and has 
the right to impose certain sanc﬒ ons.
The period in the organiza﬒ on’s existence, • 
star﬒ ng immediately a﬎ er the term of the 
sale contract up to the survey implementa﬒ on 
moment.
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The second period a﬐ racts a﬐ en﬒ on because of 
varied models of ownership, observed in the pri-
va﬒ zed organiza﬒ ons (dominant foreign investors, 
“workers-managers” partnerships, dispersed own-
ership, cross-ownership, dominant local investors, 
a consor﬒ um between a “workers-managers” 
partnership and a migh﬑  investor), existence of re-
sidual state-owned shares, enacted employee stock 
ownership schemes, unsa﬒ sfi ed res﬒ tu﬒ on claims, 
a joint par﬒ cipa﬒ on of investors with diff erent cul-
tures and the on-going new owners’ regrouping 
process, which bring forth many problems. 
Consequently, now Bulgarian economy’s basic 
problem is not the ownership transi﬒ on in private 
en﬒ ﬒ es (How? When? Whom to? What condi-
﬒ ons?). The quali﬑  of the post-priva﬒ za﬒ on man-
agement in the industrial organiza﬒ ons comes to 
the surface, because it has to ensure the adher-
ence to the trea﬑  obliga﬒ ons by the new owners 
and the enhancement of the companies’ com-
pe﬒ ﬒ veness. History shows that some﬒ mes these 
aims may be contradictory to each other because 
of environmental complexi﬑  and dynamism.
During the post-priva﬒ za﬒ on period the 
managers of many industrial organiza﬒ ons 
face diff erent challenges: the fi rst (already 
men﬒ oned) is due to the accepted obliga﬒ ons 
to the Priva﬒ za﬒ on agency (contract clauses, 
arranging social aspects, investment program, 
environmental obliga﬒ ons, etc.).
The second springs from bad management 
(including postponed restructuring) in these 
organiza﬒ ons, because of insuffi  cient fi nances, 
unsa﬒ sfactory level of competency and/or 
mo﬒ va﬒ on in previous management teams 
and poli﬒ cal infl uence. The organiza﬒ onal 
restructuring is unavoidable and exigent for the 
survival of these enterprises.
The third results from enacted labor and social 
laws, enacted collec﬒ ve labor contracts and 
other agreements with the trade-unions.
The fourth stems from the iner﬒ a of company 
decay, which inevitably aff ects the new 
shareholders, even if they do not realize it. 
But the spiral of decay in great number of 
organiza﬒ ons in Bulgaria winds up by the 
dominant environment of secrecy and denial, 
permanent cri﬒ cal a﬐ itude and haugh﬒ ness, 
responsibili﬑  avoidance and turf wars, passivi﬑  
and helplessness, ﬑ pical for the con﬒ nuous 
poli﬒ cal and economical crisis in Bulgaria.
The fi ﬎ h comes from the European Union 
accession of our country, which enforced the 
industrial organiza﬒ ons to implement within 
certain end terms many requirements, posed 
by the European Commi﬐ ee representa﬒ ves 
during the nego﬒ a﬒ on process and accepted as 
obliga﬒ ons in the accession contract chapters, 
signed by the Bulgarian government (for instance 
implementa﬒ on of quali﬑  management systems, 
ecological requirements, new rights for the 
customers, etc.).
The sixth is due to the intensifi ed global 
compe﬒ ﬒ on, even forcing the new owners to 
return to the markets, lost by the companies in 
the 1990s.
The seventh springs from the managers’ values, 
ways of thinking and deep beliefs in rela﬒ on to 
the human resource management (HRM). It 
seems, that the Bulgarian socie﬑  has not defi ned 
yet (or can not economically aff ord to select) the 
profi le of the desired investors, demonstra﬒ ng 
appropriate fi rm culture. Few of the companies, 
included in Fortune’s “Top 500” list of the most 
successful fi rms, engage in produc﬒ on ac﬒ vi﬒ es 
on the territory of our country. The companies’ 
owners, registered under the cover of the off -
shore zones, represent high percent. In addi﬒ on, 
a part of the foreign investors, registered in the 
developed countries, turn out to be possessions 
of migh﬑  organiza﬒ onal groups from other 
regions of the world, including other economies 
in transi﬒ on. 
Ar﬒ cles
53
The eighth results from the complexi﬑  in 
management of a great number of enterprises 
by the former priva﬒ za﬒ on funds, most of 
which were transformed into holdings in order 
to be able to possess more than 34 % of their 
daughter-companies.
Experience reveals that whatever balance is 
sought in the process of mee﬒ ng the above 
men﬒ oned challenges, the new owners of pri-
vate industrial enterprises at least have to mini-
mize the unfavorable consequences of failure 
to fulfi ll the accepted obliga﬒ ons. That is why 
the rela﬒ ons with the Post-priva﬒ za﬒ on control 
agency a﬐ ain great importance. In some cases 
these rela﬒ ons aggravate, because of failure to 
fulfi ll or skillfully undertaken ac﬒ ons for circum-
ven﬒ on of contract terms by the new owner. 
The accomplishment of such ac﬒ ons results from 
the economy dynamics, which determines that 
keeping of the contracted terms under chang-
ing environmental condi﬒ ons, may deteriorate 
the performance of (and/or even turn out to 
be disastrous for) the priva﬒ zed organiza﬒ on. As 
a whole, certain demeanour does not generate 
insurmountable problems for the new owners of 
private industrial enterprises, because of slug-
gish legal proceedings, insuffi  cient organiza﬒ onal 
capaci﬑  of the state administra﬒ on, dealing 
with the priva﬒ za﬒ on process, shortcomings in 
the enacted laws and lack of laws in certain ar-
eas. This contributes to low percent collec﬒ on of 
state receipts of penal﬒ es for braking contract-
ed obliga﬒ ons by the new owners of industrial 
enterprises. In addi﬒ on, these state receipts are 
not traded as cessions. There is no uniform ap-
praisal system of reasons, benefi ts and alterna-
﬒ ves for signing annexes in addi﬒ on to enacted 
contracts between certain ministries and private 
en﬒ ﬒ es, which may provoke acts of subjec﬒ ve 
a﬐ itude in “state – investors” rela﬒ ons. Some 
expenses, made by the managers of private in-
dustrial organiza﬒ ons, can not be unambiguously 
classifi ed as “investments”, because the enacted 
Law on accountancy makes no provision of such 
cases, although it should classify the expenses 
as current and investments. S﬒ ll, a regula﬒ on of 
such expense classifi ca﬒ on is not created. The 
Law on priva﬒ za﬒ on does not defi ne the people, 
working on civil-law contracts for personal serv-
ices (workmanship contracts), as personnel of 
the private industrial organiza﬒ on, although the 
enacted labour laws treat them the same way as 
the people with labour (employment) contract. 
The Agency of post-priva﬒ za﬒ on control has 
the right only to ascertain, that a priva﬒ za﬒ on 
contract is liable to braking, but the respec﬒ ve 
ministry or the Priva﬒ za﬒ on agency have to un-
dertake ac﬒ ons for endorsement of the shares. 
According to the law this endorsement has to 
be voluntarily accomplished by the current en-
terprise owner, but experience reveals that such 
case has not occurred, so legal proceedings are 
ini﬒ ated. A precedent for reverse acquisi﬒ on of 
priva﬒ zed industrial organiza﬒ on by the state, 
because of failure to fulfi ll the priva﬒ za﬒ on con-
tract terms, has not happened yet. And a con-
troversial ques﬒ on emerges: “To what extent 
was a new economic environment established, 
providing opportuni﬒ es of Bulgaria’s full indus-
trial restructuring a﬎ er the priva﬒ za﬒ on?”.
Addi﬒ onally, the low levels of personal incomes, 
the weak investment culture of the local 
popula﬒ on and the lack of migh﬑  ins﬒ tu﬒ onal 
investors – pension and mutual funds, insurance 
companies, further stock exchange market’s 
underdevelopment and ineffi  ciency, so that the 
traded shares of the private industrial enterprises 
(not only their shares) can not reach their fair 
market value. This forces the managers to 
abstain from off ering for sale their shares on the 
stock exchange, so they have to do without the 
cheapest credit resource. On the other hand the 
ineffi  cient appraisal of the traded securi﬒ es by 
the capital market s﬒ mulates the shareholders to 
wait for higher prices, hampers the performance 
appraisals of the traded companies, may exert 
unfavorable infl uence on management quali﬑ 
and “managers – shareholders” rela﬒ ons.
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The workforce repor﬒ ng schemes of the 
Employment agency and the Na﬒ onal sta﬒ s﬒ cal 
ins﬒ tute do not allow: defi ning the exact 
number of the popula﬒ on, living in Bulgaria 
at frequent periods (months, seasons, etc.), 
defi ning the exact percent of the unemployed, 
and the natural unemployment rate is le﬎ 
indefi nite at this stage of Bulgaria’s economic 
development. That is why the managers hardly 
develop an adequate general company strategy 
and an adequate human resource strategy, 
but the poli﬒ cal promises quickly prove to be 
unrealis﬒ c and fi nally the business circles form 
their pessimis﬒ c expecta﬒ ons.
Methodology of the survey
T
he priva﬒ zed industrial organiza﬒ ons operate 
in complex and dynamic environment, which 
heightens the importance of the human resources 
for the organiza﬒ onal survival and achievement 
of sustainable compe﬒ ﬒ ve advantage. HRM is 
conducted through interac﬒ on between the 
organiza﬒ on, represented by its managers, and 
the employees. The recommended in the popular 
literature approaches, principles, purposes, 
methods, techniques and prac﬒ ces, ﬑ pical for 
the leading organiza﬒ ons from the developed 
economies, are chosen as standard of HRM 
in the priva﬒ zed industrial enterprises. Thus, 
the lack of authen﬒ c informa﬒ on about HRM 
in leading organiza﬒ ons from the developed 
economies is compensated to some degree. 
The collec﬒ ng of greater volume and more 
reliable informa﬒ on about HRM in the priva﬒ zed 
industrial organiza﬒ ons requires a ques﬒ onnaire 
survey to be conducted in a group of fi ve 
priva﬒ zed industrial enterprises, opera﬒ ng in 
diff erent branches, each of them with personnel 
of at least 250 people. The following basic 
research ques﬒ on is posed: “What are the HRM 
system components, processes and rela﬒ ons in 
the private industrial organiza﬒ ons?” A part of 
the results, received in this ques﬒ onnaire survey, 
is shown in this ar﬒ cle. These results represent 
the following inves﬒ ga﬒ ve ques﬒ ons:
How are the hired workers (employees) paid • 
in the organiza﬒ on? It includes ques﬒ ons 16 – 
18 from the ques﬒ onnaire.
What are the characteris﬒ cs of the company’s • 
labor policy? It includes ques﬒ ons 19 – 22 from 
the ques﬒ onnaire.
To what extent do the managers use • 
contemporary prac﬒ ces in the managing of 
their subordinates and the interac﬒ on among 
themselves? It includes ques﬒ ons 23 – 32 from 
the ques﬒ onnaire.
Each inves﬒ ga﬒ ve ques﬒ on is represented 
by a number of ques﬒ ons, shown on the 
distributed form (q.o.f.), and directed to the 




ccording to the inquired people “the premium, 
which amount depends on the total fi nancial 
results of the company” (81.5 %) and the bonus 
pay (37 %) are the most popular addi﬒ onal 
rewards. In this way the managers take pains 
to unite the personnel through planned equal 
percent for everyone, and without delega﬒ ng 
to the supervisors the right conten﬒ ously to 
determine “the individual contribu﬒ on” of their 
subordinates within certain means of payment, 
allocated to the unit.
The managers in the inves﬒ gated organiza﬒ ons 
do not use: “employees’ stock ownership for free 
or with abatement from the price”, “employees’ 
op﬒ ons for stock ownership for free or with 
abatement from the price”, “well pay” and 
“safe﬑  pay” (q.o.f.16) (see Table1).
The rejec﬒ on of personnel’s s﬒ mula﬒ on by 
means of stock ownership plans reveals that the 
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managers: do not assume the organiza﬒ ons may 
greatly increase their profi tabili﬑  in the near 
future; underes﬒ mate the personnel’s role for 
improvement of the company’s performance; 
and fear of strengthening the workers’ infl uence 
on the management boards.
The abstaining from applica﬒ on of “well pay” 
prompts that the managers in the surveyed 
companies take the current unemployment level 
and the non-payment of compensa﬒ on during 
an employee’s absence as effi  cient disciplining 
factors in the career of their subordinates.
The administra﬒ ve penal﬑  provisions for 
employers in cases of labor injuries do not upset 
the managers, because of their low rates. This 
is the reason why the managers do not off er 
“safe﬑  pay” to their subordinates.
Table 1. Provided additional rewards.
Group $X16 Provided addi﬒ onal rewards. 16. What addi﬒ onal rewards does the company provide for you? 
(You may mark more than one answer.) 
Mul﬒ ple Response: (Value tabulated = 1)
Dichotomy label Name Count Pct of responses Pct of cases
premium, which amount depends on the 
total fi nancial results of the company
X16.1 22 59.5 81.5
bonus pay X16.4 10 27.0 37.0
profi t-sharing pay X16.5 3 8.1 11.1
loss preven﬒ on pay X16.6 1 2.7 3.7
gain-sharing pay X16.9 1 2.7 3.7
Total responses  37 100.0 137.0
23 missing cases; 27 valid cases;
Table 2. Basis of individual remuneration value.
17. On what basis is the value of your remunera﬒ on in the company defi ned?
Values of the variable Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumula﬒ ve percent
Valid
individual quan﬒ ta﬒ ve results 2 4 5.1 5.1
exerted eff orts (worked off  ﬒ me, 
shown assidui﬑ , etc.,)
13 26 33.3 38.5
proven capabili﬒ es (poten﬒ al) 15 30 38.5 76.9
other (but no comment) 5 10 12.8 89.7
by the contract 2 4 5.1 94.9
by the law 1 2 2.6 97.4
the lowest compensa﬒ on for the 
posi﬒ on
1 2 2.6 100.0
Total 39 78 100.0  
 
 
Missing System 11 22  
 Total 50 100
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The inquired people state that “proven 
capabili﬒ es (poten﬒ al)” (38.5 %) and “exerted 
eff orts (worked off  ﬒ me, shown assidui﬑ , etc.)” 
(33.3 %) are the most popular bases for value 
determina﬒ on of the individual remunera﬒ on. 
22 % of the inquired people have not answered 
this ques﬒ on (q.o.f.17) (see Table2). This shows 
that worker’s compensa﬒ on in the surveyed 
companies predominantly depends on diplomas 
and cer﬒ fi cates, personal traits, references by 
previous employers or tests and compe﬒ ﬒ ons, 
which is appropriate only in case of signing on an 
enterprise for a star﬒ ng salary. The incumbent’s 
presence on the workplace, the demonstra﬒ on 
of assidui﬑  in doing one’s job and the comple﬒ on 
of a certain task within a planned period of ﬒ me 
are the key factors, determining employee’s 
remunera﬒ on.
The compensa﬒ on of individual quan﬒ ta﬒ ve 
results is seldom used in the surveyed 
organiza﬒ ons, which does not further high-
produc﬒ ve labor, high quali﬑  standards and 
implementa﬒ on of techniques for qualita﬒ ve 
and quan﬒ ta﬒ ve measurement of employee 
performance. High percent of the respondents 
have not replied to this ques﬒ on, which reveals 
that remunera﬒ on se﬐ lement is ambiguous for 
the workers (employees).
The cumula﬒ ve percent shows that 97.7 % of the 
respondents do not know the amount of the cur-
rent managers’ remunera﬒ on packages (q.o.f.18) 
(see Table 3). Hiding of informa﬒ on about the 
structure and the amount of remunera﬒ on pack-
ages in an organiza﬒ on causes gossiping, rumors, 
distrust, dissemina﬒ on of erroneous informa﬒ on 
and undermines the intrinsic fairness feeling in the 
workers. A graded response scale with seven alter-
na﬒ ves is used here. The alterna﬒ ves in the range 
of “1 – never ÷ 4 – neutral” are counted as a neg-
a﬒ ve answer. The alterna﬒ ves in the range of “5 ÷ 
7 – always” are counted as a posi﬒ ve answer.
52.8 % of the respondents consider that there 
are instances of insiders’ being promoted to 
management posi﬒ ons. Thus, the managers 
make eff orts to s﬒ mulate the employees’ 
career endeavors. 26 % of the respondents 
can not assess, which shows a great varie﬑  of 
methods, ensuring incumbents in the companies’ 
management posi﬒ ons (q.o.f.19) (see Table 4).
90 % of the respondents are appointed to the 
respec﬒ ve employer by means of unlimited labor 
contract, the others – by means of periodic 
labor contract (q.o.f.20). This reveals that the 
managers in the surveyed industrial organiza﬒ ons 
abide with the labor laws.
Table 3.
18. Does the company management inform you about the amount of the current managers’ remunera﬒ on 
packages?
Values of the variable Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumula﬒ ve percent
Valid
1 – never 40 80 90.9 90.9
2 2 4 4.5 95.5
3 1 2 2.3 97.7
5 1 2 2.3 100.0
Total 44 88 100.0
 Missing







88 % percent of the respondents work under 
the condi﬒ on of full work day (day ﬒ me shi﬎ ). 
Over﬒ me is o﬎ en required by the employers 
of 22 % of the respondents. 14 % of the 
respondents work in rest days. “Disunited 
working ﬒ me”, “diff erent work ﬒ me, depending 
on the season”, “incomplete work day” and 
“half work day (job sharing)” are not used in the 
surveyed enterprises (q.o.f.21) (see Figure 1). 
The industrial branch, the specifi c character of 
the ac﬒ vi﬒ es, the used machines, equipment, 
technologies etc. determine the applicable 
forms of work ﬒ me fl exibili﬑  in the surveyed 
companies.
The cumula﬒ ve percent shows that 92.9 % of 
the respondents a﬐ ribute negligible infl uence 
to the labor union in the respec﬒ ve company 
(q.o.f.22). These results are validated by the 
widely-reported common tendency in Bulgaria 
towards abatement of the power of the local 
labor unions as a whole, which may be explained 
with the undertaken laying-off s immediately a﬎ er 
the priva﬒ za﬒ on of the respec﬒ ve enterprises 
Table 4.
19. How o﬎ en are insiders from the company promoted to management posi﬒ ons?
Values of the variable Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumula﬒ ve percent
Valid
1 – never 2 4 5,6 5,6
2 5 10 13,9 19,4
3 3 6 8,3 27,8
4 – neutral 7 14 19,4 47,2
5 6 12 16,7 63,9
6 3 6 8,3 72,2
7 – always 10 20 27,8 100
Total 36 72 100
 Missing





Figure 1. Workday characteristics. Group $X21 Workday characteristics. 21. What is your work day in 
the company characterized with? (You may mark more than one answer.) Multiple Response: (Value 
tabulated = 1). 0 missing cases; 50 – valid cases.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Work in rest days
Over﬒me is o﬎en required
Annually/monthly/weekly nego﬒ated working hours
Flexible working ﬒me
Full work day in shi﬎s
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and the trade-union’s inabili﬑  of protec﬒ ng the 
interests of the great number of their members 
at that ﬒ me. 
77.3 % of the respondents state that their 
immediate superiors (supervisors) set them 
a personal example in managing (q.o.f.23). 
The personnel laying-off s and the resulted 
con﬒ nuous absten﬒ on from employees’ 
(workers’) appointments during the fi rst years 
a﬎ er the priva﬒ za﬒ on determine that the 
managers are familiar with their subordinates 
and the processes in the surveyed companies. 
The experienced hardships have educated them 
that managers and employees (workers) are 
passengers in one boat. That is why new labour 
ethics, suppor﬒ ng the successful development of 
the surveyed enterprises, emerges. 
89.1 % of the respondents consider that their 
supervisors do not show disrespect/disregard 
of talented employees (q.o.f.24). The mutually 
experienced organiza﬒ onal re-engineering 
has contributed substan﬒ ally to personnel’s 
unifi ca﬒ on or at least to the establishment of 
confl ict avoidance aspira﬒ on. On the other hand 
the supervisors of the surveyed companies have 
no rights to select and dismiss their subordinates 
or distribute collec﬒ ve extrinsic rewards among 
them in comparison to their colleagues, working 
for leading organiza﬒ ons from the developed 
countries. The survey registered even a case 
of a fi red supervisor in one of the surveyed 
companies, because of his workers’ complaints.
83.3 % of the respondents consider that their 
supervisors do not shirk to assume responsibili﬑  
(q.o.f.25). The supervisors, working in private 
industrial organiza﬒ ons, must be ready for making 
decisions and ini﬒ a﬒ ng ac﬒ ons in more complex 
environment – breaking the ice (working well) 
with any new owner (or his representa﬒ ves), 
suppor﬒ ng the seamless func﬒ oning of the 
respec﬒ ve enterprise, although the experienced 
(and some﬒ mes repeated) ownership structure 
changes – results of mergers and acquisi﬒ ons. The 
regrouping of the new owners was the outcome 
of these mergers and acquisi﬒ ons. This process 
started immediately a﬎ er the sale of the greatest 
part of state’s assets, liable to priva﬒ za﬒ on. 
Table 5.
26. Does the supervisor keep the rule: “the boss is always right”, regarding the managers from the higher 
hierarchical levels?
Values of the variable Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumula﬒ ve percent
Valid
1 – never 3 6 8,3 8,3
2 5 10 13,9 22,2
3 2 4 5,6 27,8
4 – neutral 5 10 13,9 41,7
5 2 4 5,6 47,2
6 9 18 25 72,2
7 – always 10 20 27,8 100
Total 36 72 100
Missing






58.3 % of the respondents state that their 
supervisors keep the rule: “the boss is always 
right”, regarding the managers from the higher 
hierarchical levels (q.o.f.26) (see Table 5). 
Supervisors’ survival drive appears as a logical 
result, given the high percent of unemployment 
at survey’s realiza﬒ on moment, the necessi﬑ 
of working well with every new owner of the 
enterprise. The high percent of the surveyed 
people, who have not responded to this 
ques﬒ on, may be analyzed as demonstra﬒ on of 
cau﬒ ousness in order not to create unwanted 
confl icts with their superiors.
63.4 % of the respondents assess that their 
managers collaborate in the name of the 
company’s mission (q.o.f.27), which reveals a 
tendency to management quali﬑  improvements in 
the surveyed enterprises a﬎ er the priva﬒ za﬒ on. 
75 % of the respondents consider that 
their supervisors pose clear requirements to 
them (their work) (q.o.f.28). The supervisors’ 
demeanor results from acquired educa﬒ on, 
accumulated experience, acquaintance with 
the subordinates and acquired addi﬒ onal 
qualifi ca﬒ on, provided by foreign producers of 
machines, equipment and new technologies, 
implemented a﬎ er the priva﬒ za﬒ on in some of 
the surveyed companies. 
74 % of the respondents consider that their 
supervisors give support to the subordinates’ 
work (q.o.f.29). The power and the direc﬒ ons of 
this support are probably diff erent in each of the 
surveyed companies, because the supervisors’ 
inten﬒ ons are confi ned by the assigned rights 
and obliga﬒ ons in their job-descrip﬒ ons (for 
instance: to distribute the work, to train their 
subordinates, etc.) and the dominant fi rm 
culture. 
55 % of the respondents consider that their 
supervisors do not win their loyal﬑  with 
promises of job securi﬑  (q.o.f.30) (see Table 6). 
The supervisors’ organiza﬒ onal statute (for 
example: limited rights in appointment and 
dismissal of employees) and the history of these 
enterprises in the transi﬒ on period clearly reveal 
that these en﬒ ﬒ es are not capable of keeping 
such promises.
Table 6.
30. Does the supervisor win your loyal﬑  with promises of job securi﬑ ?
Values of the variable Frequency Percent Valid percent Cumula﬒ ve percent
Valid
1 – never 8 16 20 20
2 6 12 15 35
3 4 8 10 45
4 – neutral 4 8 10 55
5 4 8 10 65
6 7 14 17,5 82,5
7 – always 7 14 17,5 100
Total 40 80 100
 Missing
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68.4 % of the respondents declare that their 
supervisors show long term orienta﬒ on in job 
excellence (q.o.f.31). This answer is probably a 
result from the training sessions, accompanying 
the implementa﬒ on of ISO quali﬑  management 
systems, characterized by required cer﬒ fi cates 
and accidental checks in the enterprises by 
specialized organiza﬒ ons. 
56 % of the respondents state that they 
do not have to sacrifi ce their personal life 
(insuffi  cient a﬐ en﬒ on to spouse, children, 
sports and entertainment), because of career 
successes (q.o.f.32). In this way most of the 
people, working in the surveyed companies, 
achieve acceptable “work – family” balance. 
It may be concluded that the employers do 
not put under pressure their workers in this 
respect, because they can not ( or do not want 
to) ensure the necessary condi﬒ ons of the 
workers’ achieving higher labour produc﬒ vi﬑ 
and propose remunera﬒ on packages at the 
levels of the leading companies from the 
developed economies.
The group of the survey respondents has the 
following demographic characteris﬒ cs (q.o.f.33 – 
37): a) Gender: 36 % – males and 64 % – 
females; b) Educa﬒ onal level: 2 % – elementary 
educa﬒ on, 2 % – secondary educa﬒ on, 32 % – 
specialized secondary educa﬒ on, 4 % – college 
educa﬒ on, 2 % – higher educa﬒ on: bachelor’s 
degree, 58 % – higher educa﬒ on: master’s 
degree; c) Age: 4 % – 18 – 25 years, 32 % – 
26 – 35 years, 44 % – 36 – 50 years, and 
20 % – 51 – 65 years; d) Occupied posi﬒ on: 
12,8 % – func﬒ onal managers, 68.1 % – 
specialists, 8.5 % – assistants, 10.6 % – 
workers; e) Length of service in the company: 
10 % – less than 1 year, 8 % – between 1 and 
2 years, 4 % – between 2 and 3 years, 18 % – 
between 3 and 5 years, 12 % – between 5 and 
10 years, 48 % – 10 years and more.
Conclusion
T
he following conclusions answer the already 
men﬒ oned inves﬒ ga﬒ ve ques﬒ ons:
The surveyed companies lead more • 
conserva﬒ ve compensa﬒ on policies in 
comparison to the leading organiza﬒ ons from 
the developed economies. For example the 
workers’ (employees’) access to stock ownership 
in the surveyed enterprises is limited to the 
guaranteed shares by the Law on priva﬒ za﬒ on. 
The amounts and the levels of compensa﬒ on are 
secret in the surveyed companies. The diversi﬑  
poten﬒ al of the management methods is not 
completely u﬒ lized.
The surveyed companies lead more • 
conserva﬒ ve labour policies in comparison to 
the leading organiza﬒ ons from the developed 
economies, regarding the extent of trade-
unions’ infl uence on the management boards 
and the working-﬒ me fl exibili﬑ .
As a whole, the managers use contempo-• 
rary prac﬒ ces in the managing of their subor-
dinates and the interac﬒ on among themselves, 
depending on acquired organiza﬒ onal statute, 
held deep beliefs, domina﬒ ng organiza﬒ onal cli-
mate, etc. The poten﬒ al of the administra﬒ ve 
and social-psychological methods of manage-
ment is not completely u﬒ lized in the surveyed 
companies.   
